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The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues 
concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between 
neural systems and the wider world in which they function.  “Physically embodied, 
environmentally embedded” approaches thus loom large on the contemporary cognitive 
scientific scene.  Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely 
embodied, embedded science of the mind is still unclear.  I begin by sketching a few 
examples of the approach, and then raise a variety of critical questions concerning its 
nature and scope.  A distinction is drawn between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: 
‘simple’ cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts 
that retain the focus on inner organization and processing, and more radical appeals, in 
which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the 
subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science.  
Things of the Flesh 
Cognitive science is bringing the body out of the closet. Talk of embodiment, and 
situatedness looms increasingly large in philosophy1-5, psychology6-7, neuroscience8,9, 
robotics10-11, education12-14, cognitive anthropology15,16, linguistics4,17, and in dynamical 
systems approaches to behavior and thought18,19.  Something is afoot.  But it is 
surprisingly – and frustratingly – hard to get a firm grip on exactly what it is.  What is 
“embodied cognitive science” and how far can it take us? 
We can begin by illustrating some of the varied roles that embodiment can play. 
Fish 
Consider first the swimming know-how of the Bluefin Tuna.  The Bluefin Tuna is a 
swimming prodigy, but its aquatic capacities – its ability to turn sharply, to move off 
quickly, and to reach such high speeds – have puzzled biologists.  Physically speaking, so 
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it seemed, the fish should be too weak (by about a factor of 7) to achieve these feats.  But 
the explanation is not magic, but the canny use of embodied, environmentally embedded 
action.  Fluid dynamicists at MIT20 suggest that the fish use bodily action to manipulate 
and exploit the local environment (water) so as to swim faster, blast off more quickly, 
and so on.  They (the fish) find and exploit naturally occurring currents so as to gain 
speed, and use tail flaps to create additional vortices and pressure gradients, which are 
then used for quick take-off and rapid turns.  The physical system whose functioning 
explains the prodigious swimming capacities is thus the fish-as-embedded-in, and as 
actively exploiting, its local environment. 
Robots 
Next in line is a hopping robot.  Raibert and Hodgins, back in 199321, designed and 
built robots that balance and move by hopping on a single leg – basically, a pneumatic 
cylinder with a kind of foot. To get the hopper to locomote – to move, balance, and turn – 
involves solving a control problem that is radically impacted by the mechanical details, 
such as the elastic rebound when the leg hits the floor.  The crucial control parameters 
include items such as leg spring rest length, and degree of sideways tilt.  To understand 
how the robot’s ‘brain’ controls the robot’s motions involves a shift towards an embodied 
perspective.  The controller must learn to exploit the rich intrinsic dynamics of the 
system.  As Fred Keijzer (in his doctoral dissertation, "The Generation of Behavior", 
University of Leiden, 1998, p. 125) recently put it, “instead of thinking about [the] 
control system as a center for commands to be executed by actuators, the body and its 
movements are taken as a system with its own dynamic characteristics.”  A similar story 




Or consider vision.  There is now a growing body of work devoted to so-called 
Animate22 (or interactive23) vision.  The key insight here is that the task of vision is not to 
build rich inner models of a surrounding 3D reality24, but rather to use visual information 
efficiently and cheaply in the service of real-world, real-time action.  Animate and 
Interactive vision thus rejects what Churchland, Ramachandran, et al23 nicely dub the 
paradigm of “pure vision” – the idea (associated with work in classical AI and in the use 
of vision for planning), that vision is largely a means of creating a world model rich 
enough to let us “throw the world away’, targeting reason and thought upon the inner 
model instead.  Real-world action, in these ‘pure vision’ paradigms, functions merely as a 
means of implementing solutions arrived at by pure cognition.  The Animate vision 
paradigm22, by contrast, gives action a starring role.  Here, computational economy and 
temporal efficiency is purchased by a variety of bodily action and local environment 
exploiting tricks and ploys including 
• the use of cheap, easy-to-detect (possibly idiosyncratic) environmental cues 
(searching for Kodak film in a drug store? Seek ‘Kodak yellow’). 
• the use of active sensing (use motor action, guided by rough perceptual analysis, to 
seek further inputs yielding better perceptual data.  Move head and eyes for better 
depth perception, etc.). 
• the use of repeated consultations of the world in place of rich, detailed inner models. 
Vision, this body of work suggests, is a highly active and intelligent process.  It is not 
the passive creation of a rich inner model, so much as the active retrieval (typically by 
moving the high resolution fovea in a saccade) of useful information as it is needed from 
the constantly present real-world scene.  Ballard et al25 speak of “just-in-time 
representation”, while the roboticist, Rodney Brooks, has coined the slogan “The world is 
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its own best model”11.  The moral is clear: vision makes the most of the persisting 
external scene, and gears its computational activity closely and sparingly to the task at 
hand.  
Action and Affordance 
Related insights stem from the work of J. J. Gibson26,27 and the ecological psychology 
movement7,28,29.  This work stresses bodily movement, ecological context and the action-
relevant information available in the perceptual array.  A central organizing construct is 
the concept of an affordance26.  Affordances are the possibilities for use, intervention and 
action which the physical world offers a given agent and are determined by the “fit” 
between the agent’s physical structure capacities and skills and the action-related 
properties of the environment itself30. 
 A simple but illustrative example is Lee and Reddish’s31 account of how diving 
birds, such as plovers and gannets, are able to close their wings at exactly the right 
moment before hitting the surface of the water in pursuit of a fish.  Such behavior is 
possible because there is available in the optic array, a higher order invariant which is 
ideal for the control of such action.  This quantity (which involves the relative rate of 
expansion of the image in the optic array) accurately predicts time to impact and can be 
used to time wing closing, as well as other behaviors, such as the timing of an athlete’s 
jump. 
 A similar story can help explain how an outfielder positions herself to catch a fly 
ball. It used to be thought that this problem required complex calculations of the arc, 
acceleration, and distance of the ball.  More recent work, however, suggests a 
computationally simpler strategy32.  Roughly, you continually adjust your run so that the 
ball never seems to curve towards the ground, but instead looks to move in a straight line 
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in your visual field. By maintaining such a co-ordination, it is mathematically guaranteed 
that you will end up in the right place to catch the ball. 
Notice the difference between the two models.  In the traditional model, the brain 
takes in data, performs a complex computation that solves the problem (where will the 
ball land?) and then tells the body where to go.  There is a nice linear processing cycle: 
perceive, compute, and act.  In the second model, the problem is not solved ahead of 
time. Instead, the task is to maintain, by multiple, on-going, real-time adjustments to the 
run, a kind of co-ordination between the inner and the outer.  Such co-ordination 
dynamics constitute something of a challenge to traditional ideas about perception and 
action.  For they replace the notion of rich internal representations and computations, 
with the notion of less expensive strategies whose task is not to first represent the world 
and then reason on the basis of the representation, so much as to maintain a kind of 
adaptively potent equilibrium which couples the agent and the world.  Whether such 
strategies are genuinely non-representational and non-computational, or suggestive 
instead of different kinds of representation (“action-oriented representations”) and more 
efficient forms of computation, is a difficult question whose resolution remains 
uncertian2,6,7,18,33,34,35. 
 What is clear, however, is that tuning to higher order invariants can help explain a 
wide variety of adaptive responses, including visually guided locomotion36,37, rhythmic 
movement18,38, and the capacity to grasp and wield objects7 (hammer, golf clubs, and so 
on).  In all these cases (see also Box 1) behavioral success involves locking on to simple 
(but often far from obvious) properties of the environment made available in the 
perceptual array.  
Beyond Adaptive Coupling?So just what does the embodiment boom mean for 
cognitive science?  The honest truth is, it is just too soon to tell.  But there are a number 
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of difficulties that clearly remain to be resolved.  An immediate question is, to what 
extent, if at all, can the embodied, embedded story contribute to our understanding of so-
called call “representation-hungry”39 problem-solving?  To get a fix on this idea, consider 
the much simpler notion of adaptive coupling.  Adaptive coupling occurs when some 
system (typically a plant or animal) evolves a mechanism which allows it to track the 
behavior of some other system (a predator, perhaps, or a source of food or energy).  To 
borrow an example from Brian Cantwell Smith40, the sunflower has evolved to track the 
daily motion of the sun across the sky.  The sunflower thus has states that co-vary with 
solar position, and this is what they are meant (evolutionarily speaking) to do.  But does 
the sunflower thereby exhibit cognition, or mentality, or intentionality; does it harbor 
internal representations?  A common – and I think correct – intuition is that it does not.  
There is nothing cognitive in play.  One reason we think this is that cognition has long 
been taken to involve the capacity to relate to an intentional object41 – and this means, in 
part, an object that may not be present-at-hand and that may not even exist.  The 
sunflower, by contrast, tracks the sun only when the sun is (in a certain sense, at least) 
actually there.  Or more precisely, when there is an ongoing external physical trace to 
which the sunflower can adaptively couple.  The mark of the cognitive, then, is rather 
plausibly the capacity to engage in something like off-line reason42 – reasoning in the 
absence of that which our thoughts concern.  Classical (‘disembodied’) cognitive science 
had a nice story to tell here, for by positing an inner realm richly populated with internal 
tokens that stood for external objects and states of affairs, it was able to offer a simple 
account of behavioral co-ordination in the absence of any external physical trace or 
perceptually available higher-order invariant (for some excellent discussion of the issues 
confronting a Gibsonia approach here, see Kirsh43 and Van Leeuwen44). 
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One promising move, at this point, is to suggest that embodied cognitive science 
might treat off-line reason as something like simulated sensing and acting, thus 
preserving the special flavor of embodied problem solving alongside a high degree of 
environmental de-coupleability.  The best developed version of this strategy is probably 
the mobile robotics work of Lynn Andrea Stein at the MIT Artificial Intelligence lab.  
Stein45 uses as her platform a mobile robot (designed and implemented by Maja 
Mataric46) named TOTO (see box 2). 
TOTO was adept at interacting with the local environment, and could even, in a weak 
sense, ‘track’ that which was not present-to-hand: it could return, on command, to a 
previously encountered location.  TOTO could not, however, be prompted to track or 
‘think about’ any location that it had not previously visited.  METATOTO45 builds on the 
original TOTO architecture to create a system capable of finding its way, on command, 
to locations that it has never previously encountered.  It does so by using the TOTO 
architecture off-line so as to support the exploration, in ‘imagination’, of a totally virtual 
‘environment’.  When METATOTO is ‘imagining’, it deploys exactly the same 
machinery that (in TOTO, and in METATOTO on-line) normally supports physical 
interactions with the real world.  The difference lies solely at the lowest-level interface: 
where TOTO uses sonar to act and navigate in a real world, METATOTO uses simulated 
sonar to explore a virtual world (including a virtual robot body).  Stein goes on to 
imagine linguistic directions interfacing with this virtual realm by translating descriptions 
such as “the second left” into TOTO (METATOTO) style action-based encodings, such 
as “short sonar left, long sonar left, short sonar left, long sonar left” (ref. 45, p. 404). 
METATOTO uses the basic behavior-producing architecture of TOTO (see box 2), 
but includes a program that can take (for example) a floor plan or map and use it to 
stimulate the robot’s sensors in the way they would be stimulated were the robot 
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locomoting along a given route on the map.  The map can thus induce sequences of 
experiences which are qualitatively similar to those generated by real sensing and acting, 
and this allows METATOTO to profit from “virtual experiences’, just as TOTO profits 
(see box 2) from real experience.  Once the sensors and motors are restored to real world 
input and action, METATOTO can immediately find its way to a target location it has not 
actually (but merely virtually) visited.  
We should now ask two (related) questions.  How different is this story from more 
traditional solutions?  And will it work for all kinds of off-line reasoning or only some?  
The first question, it seems to me, leads to a kind of mild dilemma.  For the simulation-
based story looks most clearly different (from traditional stories involving inner world 
models) just insofar as it treats planning as, quite literally, imagined interaction: thus 
Stein notes that “While traditional planners use an abstracted world and plan operators 
distinct from the actual robot controls, our system uses the robotic architecture itself” 
(ref. 45, p. 396).  To cash out this claim, Stein reminds us that METATOTO works by 
simulating both sensors and actuators, and that simulation runs recreate the kinds of 
feedback (short and long sonar signals, etc.) that would be received from the actual 
world, were the robot to really change position.  There are, of course, some idealizations: 
the simulated motion is, for example, straight and precise, unaffected by the dinks and 
slopes found in the real world.  But, overall, METATOTO does indeed rely on the 
simulation of sensori-motor experience rather than on abstract kinds of reasoning and 
planning. 
What remains unclear, however, is the scope of this kind of solution.  The reader 
might, for example, try the following exercise in abstract off-line reasoning: consider 
whether U.S. gun manufacturers should be held legally liable for having knowingly 
manufactured more guns than the legal market could possibly account for? Here it is not 
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clear how rich sensori-motor simulation could possibly account for all the kinds of moral 
and abstract reasoning required– reasoning about rights, implications, responsibilities, 
economics, and so on.  Nor is this just a point about how things introspectively seem.  
Rather, it is hard to see how sensori-motor simulation could in principle account for all 
the kinds of thought and reasoning that the topic demands.  Simulated acting and sensing 
may well play a role-and perhaps even an essential role4-in our reasoning.  But the 
capacity to examine arguments, to judge what follows from what, and to couch the issues 
in the highly abstract terms of fundamental moral debate (using concepts like ’liability’, 
reasonable expectation’, ‘acceptable risk’, etc., etc.) does not lend itself-on the face of 
things- to an analysis in terms of the endogenous generation of, and response to, anything 
like sequences of low-level sensory inputs and/or motor outputs of the kind involved in 
literal sensori-motor simulation as done by METATOTO.  No doubt there are other, less 
direct ways to depict high level cognition as something like a de-coupled version of 
sensori-motor coordination strategies, or at least as involving the re-activation, off-line, 
of aspects of sensory experience47.  But (and here’s the mild dilemma I promised) it does 
seem that the more decoupled and abstract the target contents become, either the less 
applicable the sensori-motor simulation strategy is, or the less clearly it can then be 
differentiated from the more traditional approaches it seeks to displace.   
Simple vs. Radical Embodiment 
In addition to asking how far the embodied approach can go, we should also ask to 
what extent it is a genuinely radical alternative to more traditional views.  To focus this 
worry, I want to distinguish two different ways to appeal to facts about embodiment and 
environmental embedding.  The first, which I’ll call “simple embodiment”, treats such 
facts as, primarily, constraints upon a theory of inner organization and processing.  The 
second, which I’ll call “radical embodiment” goes much further and treats such facts as 
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profoundly altering the subject matter and theoretical framework of cognitive science.  
The distinction between the simple and radical forms is, however, not absolute, and many 
(perhaps most) good research programs end up containing elements of both. 
Examples of simple embodiment abound in the literature.  A good deal of work in 
interactive vision, for example, still trades heavily in internal representations, 
computational transformations, and abstract data structures22,25.  There is much talk for 
example, of “inner databases”, of “internal featural representations” (of color, shape and 
so on), of “high dimensional feature vectors”, and more.  Attention to the roles of body, 
world and action, in such cases, is basically a methodological tool aimed at getting the 
internal data-structures and operations right.  Churchland et al’s (ref 23, p. 60) vision of a 
“motocentric” rather than “visuocentric” cognitive science has, I suspect, a similar goal.  
Maja Mataric’s46 work on TOTO (box 2) has this flavor, insofar as it concentrates 
attention on an inner representational resource (the map/controller) and is exploring the 
ways usefulness in real-world action guidance may constrain and inform the nature of 
inner representations and processing.  Ditto, finally, for the recent body of important 
work on the role of bodily metaphors4 in abstract, high-level cognition: here, too, the 
goal is to give an account of the inner representational realm, but one informed by the 
evolutionary and developmental roles of bodily experience. 
The source of much recent excitement, however, lies in the striking claims involving 
‘radical embodiment’.  Such claims can be found in work by Tim Van Gelder48, Thelen 
and Smith6, Kelso18, Varela et al1, Turvey and Carello7 and others.  These visions of 
radical embodiment all involve one or more of the following claims: 
I. that understanding the complex interplay of brain, body and world requires new 




II. that traditional notions such as internal representation and computation are 
inadequate and unnecessary6,7,48 
III. that the typical decomposition of the cognitive system into a variety of inner 
neural or functional subsystems is often misleading, and blinds us to the 
possibility of alternative, and more explanatory, decompositions which cross-cut 
the traditional brain-body-world divisions.3,5,6,15 
Closely related to these three points is the idea that even the subject matter of 
cognitive science needs to be re-thought.  A mature science of the mind, it now seems, 
targets not (or not just) the individual, inner organization of intelligence but the bodily 
and environmentally extended organizations responsible for adaptive success2,12,15. 
Some support for claims I and II may be found in the work on infant motor 
development6,30.31    (and see box 1), adult motor actions7,18, and mobile robotics9,10,11,21.  
The support is weak, however, because the solutions that look most non-computational, 
representation-free, and dynamical-analysis (see box 3) friendly usually involve cases of 
(mere) adaptive coupling, and do not directly confront ‘representation-hungry’ problems.  
Here, we must simply suspend judgement and await empirical advance. 
My own guess, however, is that as tasks become more representation-hungry – more 
concerned with the distal, abstract and non-existent – we will see more and more 
evidence of some kinds of internal representation and inner models.  It is at exactly this 
point that the possibility of a middle-ground between simple and radical versions of 
embodiment comes into focus.  For these new kinds of internal representation may differ 
from familiar forms both in their contents (being more “deictic”25 and action-oriented2) 
and in the nature of their inner vehicles (perhaps using temporally extended processes 
and complex dynamical regularities as inner ‘tokens’2,49,50). 
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A live prospect for the fans of radical embodiment may, however, lie in claim III (the 
point about alternative systemic decompositions).  An example – which also 
demonstrates how a single research program can combine elements of simple and radical 
embodiment –is Ballard et al’s25 use of a notion of “deictic pointers”.  A pointer, in A. I., 
is an inner state, which can act both as an object of computation and as a ‘key’ for 
retrieving additional data-structures or information.  Deictic pointers, as Ballard et all 
describe them, are physical actions – such as foveating a certain location – which play a 
similar kind of functional role.  The very act of foveation, it is suggested, may be used to 
temporarily bind color to location, or to direct a reaching motion to a target.  In such 
cases, the author’s comment, “the external world is analogous to computer memory” and 
“changing gaze is analogous to changing the memory reference in a silicon computer” 
(ref 28, p. 725).  The computational organization relevant to cognition is here depicted as 
literally spread across neural, bodily and environmental elements 
In thinking about ‘higher’ cognition and advanced human reason, it may likewise 
prove fruitful to consider the literal extension of the cognitive system to include aspects 
of the local environment.  In this vein, Clark 2,51 and Hutchins 15, following Vygotsky 52, 
Bruner 53, Dennett 54 and others, have argued that just as basic forms of real-world 
success turn on the interplay between neural, bodily and environmental factors, so 
advanced cognition turns – in crucial respects – upon the complex interplay between 
individual reason, artifact and culture.  The simplest illustration of this idea is probably 
the use of artifacts such as pen and paper to support or ‘scaffold’34,55,56,57 human 
performance.  Most of us, armed with pen and paper, can (for example) solve 
multiplication problems that would baffle our unaided brains.  In so doing we create 
external symbols (numerical inscriptions) and use external storage and manipulation so 
as to reduce the complex problem to a sequence of simpler, pattern-completing steps that 
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we already command57.  On this model, then, it is the combination of our biological 
computational profile with the fundamentally different properties of a structured, 
symbolic, external resource that is a key source of our peculiar brand of cognitive 
success52,54.  The external environment, actively structured by us, becomes a source of 
cognition-enhancing ‘wideware’51: external items (devices, media, notations) that 
scaffold and complement (but typically do not replicate) biological modes of computation 
and processing, creating extended cognitive systems whose computational profiles are 
quite different from those of the naked brain.  Hutchins for example,15 gives a wonderful 
and detailed account of the way multiple biological brains, tools (such as sextants and 
alidades), and media (such as maps and charts) combine to make possible the act of ship 
navigation.  In Hutchins’ words, such tools and media “permit the users to do the tasks 
that need to be done while doing the kinds of things people are good at: recognizing 
patterns, modeling simple dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the 
environment” (Ref 15, p. 155). 
In short, the world of artifacts, texts, media (and even cultural practices and 
institutions58) may be for us what the actively created whorls and vortices are for the 
tuna.  Human brains, raised in this sea of cultural tools54 will develop strategies for 
advanced problem solving that ‘factor in’ these external resources as profoundly and 
deeply as the bodily motions of the tuna factor in and maximally exploit the reliable 
properties of the surrounding water. 
Recognizing the complex ways in which human thought and reason exploits the 
presence of external symbols and problem solving resources, and unraveling the ways 
biological brains couple themselves with these very special kinds of ecological objects, is 
surely one of the most exciting tasks confronting the sciences of embodied cognition-and 
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one that may shed great light on the role of embodiment in more abstract cognitive 
domains. 
Conclusions 
Embodied, environmentally embedded approaches have a lot to offer to the sciences 
of the mind.  It is increasingly clear that, in a wide spectrum of cases, the individual brain 
should not be the sole locus of cognitive scientific interest.  Cognition is not a 
phenomenon which can successfully be studied while marginalizing the roles of body, 
world and action. 
But many questions remain unanswered.  The embodied approach itself seems to 
come in two distinct varieties.  The first (“simple embodiment”) stresses the role of body, 
world and action in informing and constraining stories that still focus on inner 
computation, representation and problem-solving.  The second (“radical embodiment”) 
sees such a profound interplay of brain, body and world as to fundamentally transform 
both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science itself. 
The major challenge for the vision of ‘radical embodiment’ lies with the class of 
‘representation-hungry’ problems and the phenomena of off-line, abstract, and 
environmentally-decoupled reason.  It is important not to conclude, however, that facts 
about embodiment thus impact only our ideas about low-level sensorimotor processes.  
The real lesson seems to be that (in the human case, at least) we find, at all levels, a 
curious mixture of highly “embodied, embedded” and apparently much more abstract and 
potentially de-coupled strategies, with the creation and manipulation of external symbolic 
items often functioning as a kind of bridge between the two.  It thus seems likely that one 
key to understanding the nature and potency of human thought and reason lies precisely 
in understanding the complex relations and interactions between these various types of 
strategy and resource40.  (Human language skills – a topic I have deliberately surpressed 
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in this review – are a case in point, words and text being both real, external objects that 
we can encounter and manipulate and key instruments of inner, abstract, 
environmentally-decoupled reason54,59).  
In sum, the gulf between the embodied, embedded skills of the tuna and the more de-
coupled skills of the moralists and mathematicians remains.  But the size, nature and 
significance of this gap are matters for further research and debate.  At the very least, an 
embodied cognitive science must now look beyond the here-and-now production of tuned 
motor responses to the creation, maintenance and transformation of the inner and outer 
states that together allow us to know the world as an arena for embodied action.  The path 
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Box 1.  The Situated Infant. 
Thelen and Smitha show in some detail that infant walking abilities depend on 
complex interactions between neural states, the biomechanics of the legs, and local 
environmental parameters.  This view is then contrasted with the vision of walking as the 
simple expression of a temporally staged set of genetically specified instructions (ref. a, 
p. 8-20, 263-266).  Experimental support for the multi-factor view includes a 
demonstration of induced stepping in some (“non-stepping”) seven month olds held 
upright upon a motorized treadmill.  In this condition, the “non-stepping” infants could 
even compensate for twin belts, each driving a leg at a different speed!  The treadmill 
stepping, it was further discovered, depended crucially on the type of contact made 
between foot and belt: flat-foot contact induced stepping, whereas mere toe-contact 
failed.  The explanation (ref. a, p. 111-112) seems to be that the stepping behavior 
depends heavily on a spring-like biomechanical response.  To uncoil the spring and shoot 
the leg forward, it must first be stretched fully back.  Flat-foot contact with the moving 
treadmill creates this condition and initiates stepping, whereas toe contact yields 
insufficient back stretch.  Infant stepping is thus a complex, multi-factor affair in which 
the target behavior “emerges only when the central elements cooperate with the effectors 
– the muscles, joints, tendons – in the appropriate physical context” (ref. a, p. 113).  
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J.A. Scott Kelso has demonstrated similar multi-factor profiles in adult motor routines 
such as the production of rhythmic finger motionsb.  For further commentary on both of 
these cases, see Clarkc. 
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Box 2.  Maja Mataric’s TOTOa 
TOTO (see fig) uses ultrasonic range sensors to detect walls, corridors, and so on and 
is able to use its physical explorations to build an inner map of its environment, which it 
can use to revisit previously encountered locations on command.  TOTO’s internal ‘map’ 
is, however, rather special in that it encodes geographic information in an action-oriented 
(ref. 2, p. 49) way, combining information about the robot’s movement and correlated 
perceptual input.  The inner mechanisms thus record landmarks as a combination of 
robotic motion and sonar readings, so that a corridor might be encoded as a combination 
of forward motion and a sequence of short, lateral sonar distance readings.  The stored 
‘map’ is thus perfectly formatted to act as a direct controller of embodied action: using 
the map to find a route and generating a plan of actual robot movements turns out to be a 
single computational task. 
          
Fig TOTO here 
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Box 3.  Dynamical Systems Theory 
The dynamical systems approach has been gaining ground in cognitive scientific 
treatments of cognition and adaptive behaviora,b,c,d.  The dynamical approach focuses on 
the evolution of a system over time, and is particularly well-suited to dealing with cases 
in which some system or component a is constantly affecting and being affected by some 
system or component b (which may likewise be continuously sensitive to some item c 
and so on).  An example might be, for example, the process of returning a tennis serve: 
the locations of the ball and the other player (and perhaps your partner, in doubles) are 
constantly changing, and all the while, you are moving and acting, which is affecting the 
other players, and so on; in sum, “everything is simultaneously affecting everything else” 
(ref. a, p. 23).  Such densely coupled unfoldings, insofar as they prove characteristic of 
all or some human cognitive activity, seem ill-understood in traditional cognitive 
scientific terms.  By contrast, the apparatus of dynamical systems theory, with its notions 
of state spaces, coupled systems, trajectories in state space, collective variables and moree 
is expressly designed to deal with such simultaneous interactive complexity.  It provides 
a set of mathematical and conceptual tools that support a basically geometric 
understanding of the space of possible total system behaviors.  Such analyses have 
proven useful in understanding the activity of simple robotsf, infantsd, and adultsc. 
But what mileage can we get from such analyses once we leave the domain of on-the-
spot adaptive coupling and turn to various forms of off-line reason and cogitation?  One 
exciting possibility, recognized by van Gelderb and pursued by Melanie Mitchell and her 
colleaguesg, is that the dynamical approaches might transform and enrich (rather than 
displace) our computational and representational understandings, perhaps by identifying 
complex, temporally extended dynamical patterns (chaotic attractors, limit cycles, values 
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of collective variables, etc.) as the vehicles of specific representational contents and as 




• Is cognition truly seamless – implying a gentle, incremental trajectory linking 
fully embodied responsiveness to abstract thought and off-line reason?  Or is it a 
patchwork quilt, with jumps and discontinuities and with very different kinds of 
processing and representation serving different needs? 
• What role does public language play in the transition from simple adaptive 
coupling to heavy-duty cognition? 
• Insofar as we depend heavily on cultural artifacts (pen, paper, PC) to augment and 
enhance biological cognition, what should we say about their origins?  If we do 
indeed “make our world smart so that our brains can be dumb in peace”, just how 
did dumb brains create such a smart world? 
• Are the tools of dynamical systems theory replacements for, or merely additions 
to, the familiar arsenal of inner models, maps, representations and computations? 
• If we follow the embodied, embedded approach to its natural conclusions, do we 
lose sight of the differences between perception, reason and action?  If not, just 
how do we reconstruct them? 
• If we follow the embodied, embedded approach to its natural conclusions, how do 
we avoid losing sight of the distinction between the agent and the world in which 
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